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ABSTRACT
The structure of network data enables simple predictive models
to leverage local correlations between nodes to high accuracy on
tasks such as attribute and link prediction. While this is useful
for building better user models, it introduces the privacy concern
that a user’s data may be re-inferred from the network structure,
after they leave the application. We propose the privacy shadow for
measuring how long a user remains predictive from an arbitrary
time within the network. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the
length of the privacy shadow can be predicted for individual users
in three real-world datasets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Networks represent complex relationships which facilitate infor-
mation retrieval and recommendation due to the local structure
of the graph. For example, simple heuristics for link prediction [1]
and attribute prediction [19] are extremely effective by exploiting
the correlations and homophily in the local network structure [18].
Unfortunately, this also means that a node’s private attribute or
link data can be easily re-inferred from the given graph structure
[7, 27].
Prior work in the area of network privacy has focused on en-
suring a network is “safe” to publish under some criteria [8, 22],
but little work has focused on measuring the privacy dynamics of
graph-based predictions over time. Specifically, if a user removes
their data from a graph, for how long can we re-infer that data using
the last-observed graph structure? We define this length of time as
the privacy shadow. That is, we don’t observe the user directly but
leverage the network effects as a secondary image (shadow) of the
user over time.
Network application operators have incentives to build models
for users who have left their application or have become inactive,
for churn prediction, cold-starting problems, or measuring non-
users and inactive users. Therefore, application operators have a
strong incentive to build and retain a user’s model either directly
or indirectly.
Users have the expectation their data is not used after its removal.
In fact, new regulations such as the EU General Data Protections
Regulation (GDPR) explicitly require transparent removal of user
data [9]. For a network operator this means not only ensuring the
removal of an individual user’s data, but also secondary data repre-
sentations, and their encoding within subsequent machine learning
model representations. This transparency presents a unique chal-
lenge, especially in end-to-end machine learning models where
data representation and model representation are tightly coupled.
In this work, we examine the relationship between the privacy
of individual user data and secondary (especially network) repre-
sentations and predictive models, particularly over time. In order to
focus on our methodology, we use simple models and graph repre-
sentations. However, our formulation is general and can be applied
to more sophisticated predictive models, data representations such
as node embeddings, or end-to-end graph neural network models.
For the purposes of this work, a representation satisfies user
privacy when the model trained on the representation are no better
than a zero-informationmodel for predicting the target data of a user
(e.g. sensitive attributes, attribute distribution, etc). This definition
also extends over time, when a prior representation is no longer
predictive at a future time-step with respect to a zero-information
model.
1.1 Contributions
In this work, we propose and measure the concept of the privacy
shadow in dynamic networks. This is a measure of a node’s at-
tribute distribution predictability over time, from the last observed
network instance. Specifically, we do the following:
• Define the privacy shadow for node-attribute prediction
tasks.
• Provide interpretable, baseline criteria for evaluating a node’s
predictability over time.
• Demonstrate this measure on three real-world datasets with
distinct privacy shadow profiles.
2 RELATEDWORK
We organize our work around two primary areas (1) dynamic net-
work inference and prediction and (2) data privacy in networks.
Prior work in the study of networks has shown that simple
heuristics for tasks such as link prediction [1] and attribute infer-
ence [19] are very effective by leveraging the complex structure
and homophily of networks of networks. [18].
Similar work also exploits this local task performance to infer
and evaluate non-spurious networks from underlying non-network
data [4, 5]. In a similar direction, prior work define an efficient
summarization of a given network [13] often using Minimum De-
scription Length approaches [16]. Both areas of work measures the
predictive utility of some network definition. In this current work,
we do this across time, against non-network predictive baselines.
Prior work in the area of network privacy [27] has focused on
ensuring a network is “safe” with guarantees for attacks for de-
anonymization, inferring node degree, attribute or edge values [8,
15, 22, 26]. Often this work measures the utility of the sanitized rep-
resentation for downstream tasks, for example, recommendation[14].
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While many aspects of privacy are studied with respect to static
networks, very few prior works consider dynamics [3, 17, 21].
Extensive work focuses on measuring domain-specific inference
attacks of sensitive attributes, including physical location and mo-
bility [2], demographics including gender and age [10]. Other work
estimates tie strength between individuals and demographic or
other node-attribute groups [11, 24, 25].
Our work differs from these two areas in that we use predictabil-
ity over time as a general measure of the dynamics of individuals
and the population, rather than mitigating specific sensitive-data
attacks or sanitizing data for publication.
3 METHODS
3.1 Notation
This work measures predictive decay over time of nodes in attrib-
uted, dynamic graphs.
Let G = (V ,A,E) represent be an attributed graph with nodes
vi ∈ V , edges ei, j ∈ E, and node-attributes ai ∈ A. For notational
convenience G[1...T ] refers to a time-series of graphs, where Gt
is the graph at time step t , 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Similarly, ai,t denotes the
attributes of node i at time t .
We define a node neighborhood function on node i:
N (E, i) → S,where S ⊆ V (1)
,
This need not be graph adjacency but any local node sampling
function on E. Below, we omit E from the notation for simplicity.
For further notational convenience, let L ⊆ A be predictive
targets. A local model predicts the output label(s) of node i as a
function of the attributes in the neighborhood:
M(A[N (i)]) → lˆi (2)
3.2 Network prediction horizon
We formulate the network horizon prediction problem as re-inference
of node i’s labels at time t + ∆ using the graph fixed at time t :
M(At+∆[N (Et , i)]) → lˆi,t+∆ (3)
In Equation 3, the model has access to the neighborhood at-
tributes at time t + ∆, but the graph from time t . This simulates the
user leaving the system at time t and no longer generating attribute
data. We retain the network at the time of leaving. We are unable
to access the node’s attributes ai,t+, but only the attributes of i’s
last known neighboring nodes still in the system.
Our methodology is agnostic to the definition of the local model
M(). Future work will focus on model development to improve
re-inference accuracy, but the methodology is just as applicable on
better models. For now, for clarity we’ll focus only on simple aggre-
gation functions (e.g. attribute mean, neighbor-attribute sampling)
under a known attribute-to-label mapping.
3.3 Proposed measures
We organize our methodology by network prediction intervals.
Figure 1 gives a high-level overview of a prediction interval. At
time t , we observe a graph and associated attributes. For simplicity,
we only visualize a target node i and its neighborhood, and example
attribute distributions. From time t + 1, both the graph structure
and the target node i are unobservable. At some time t + ∆, we
use a local modelM() to re-infer the target labels of node i (grey),
using the graph structure (blue) we previously observed at time t .
A prediction interval measures the model’s re-inference perfor-
mance at each step ∆ = [0, 1, 2, ...tmax ], where we consider tmax
the end of available data. Recall our model (Equation 3) produces a
predicted label distribution of node i at time t . Then an interval is
simply the sequence of the model outputs starting at time t :
ri,t = [lˆi,t+∆] : ∀∆ ∈ [0, 1, ..., tmax ] (4)
This is a sequence of length tmax + 1. It is important that two
overlapping interval segments, e.g. ri,0[1] and ri,1[0] are not identi-
cal.1 In this example, both make predictions for node i at time t = 1.
However, the graph topology used by the predictive model changes
between these two intervals. Figure 2 illustrates this intuition. At
the top, we see the time series of network structures over time,
on a toy neighborhood of node i . Below that we see a collection
of intervals with different starting points (in red), until the end of
available data.
Next, we align intervals by their starting points to measure node
i’s predictability for each ∆ in expectation over starting-points. In
Figure 2 this corresponds to expectation over each column in the
alignment:
R(i) = E(L(ri [∆])) : ∀∆ ∈ [0...T ] (5)
where L is some loss or accuracy measure. This is a sequence
measuring node i’s expected predictability after ∆ steps from every
prior observed network.
For notational convenience, we also define this measure over a
set of nodes S ⊆ V on a fixed time ∆ = t :
R(S, t) = {R(i)[t] : ∀i ∈ S} (6)
In Figure 2 for each node in S, we can take the expectation over
the red column at∆ = 0. This yields the distribution of predictability
of nodes at a fixed ∆. This is a key distribution for the remainder of
our work and will define a reference distribution to measure nodes
against.
3.4 Measuring the Privacy Shadow
Using Equation 6 we can measure the decline in predictability of
the node i using models trained up to the time tr ef . We do this
with a rank-statistics (e.g. percentile) with respect to a reference
distribution:
ranki (t |tr ef ) = rank(R(V , tr ef ),R(i)[t]) (7)
Concretely, this is node i’s percentile within the reference distri-
bution at some arbitrary time t . When tr ef = t , this is the ranking
statistic of node i’s initial percentile within the distribution, i.e. at
∆ = 0. When t > tr ef , we measure node i’s predictability at a later
time, but still within the reference distribution.
We define the η-shadow of node i as the minimum ∆ such that
all subsequent rank measures are less than η:
1We use bracket notation to denote a particular element in this sequence: e.g. ri,t [j].
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Figure 1: A schematic of the network prediction interval. We observe the local neighborhood of node i at time t . Attribute
distributions are represented by the call-out. Node i is removed from the graph at time t+1. We then observe only the changing
attribute distributions of the remaining nodes. At time t + ∆ we receive the graph structure observed at time t , and construct
a modelM on the current attributes in the neighborhood of i (excluding i). The dashed edges indicate this may not be the
current graph structure. Node i is the target for label inference.
Figure 2: An overview of interval alignment. (Top) shows a
toy neighborhood network of i at each time step. (Middle)
a interval is measured on the graph starting at time t (red),
and measures the predictability of node i using this fixed
network at each available time step > t (purple). Finally,
(Bottom) we align the intervals at their starting point and
measures expectations on a particular time shift ∆ of this
alignment (e.g. across red values), where black indicates null
fill-values.
rankshadowi (tr ef ,η) = argmint ranki (tr ef , t2) ≤ η,∀t2 ≥ t (8)
The rank shadow is a measurement of time. To interpret this
measure, assume node i satisfies the 10-percentile privacy shadow
with respect to the ∆ = 0 distribution, at index t = 15. This means
that after t ≥ 15 time-steps, the node’s prediction ranking in expec-
tation is in the bottom 10 percentile of the reference distribution at
tr ef = 0.
We choose a rank-based measure because it is adaptive to ref-
erence distribution and serves as a non-parametric normalization.
Depending on application, it may be appropriate to measure the
nodes with respect to (1) an absolute prediction threshold, or (2) a
parametric reference distribution rather than the empirical ∆ = 0
distribution. Below, we fix the η threshold with respect to a zero-
information, non-network baseline. Network sampling methods
may also be appropriate, e.g. measuring against a reference distribu-
tion using community/cluster sampling. However, in our definition
of privacy, these would not serve as a zero-information baselines.
4 EVALUATION DETAILS
4.1 Neighborhood and Graph Models
4.1.1 Graph representation. In this work, we construct a training
network with somew time steps. For induced k-NN networks, we
simply calculate k-NN on the aggregated attribute distribution over
w , for the annual co-author graph, we simply union over all edges
inw .We treat thesew time steps as an aggregated time step at ∆ = 0
of a prediction interval.
4.1.2 Neighborhood Model. In this work, we apply the simple
neighborhood average as the modelM() for aggregating node at-
tributes over the graph. More sophisticated models producing at-
tribute/label distributions or dense embeddings (e.g. using Graph
Neural Networks) could be similarly measured. We choose this sim-
ple model to focus our attention on the methodology for measuring
the privacy shadow. We use bootstrap sampling with p = 0.5 drawn
from the network neighborhood, so the effective neighborhood
size is half that of our induced k-NN graph, measured over sample
realizations.
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To produce the predicted labels from the aggregated attribute
distribution, we rank label support using the attribute-label map-
ping and measure Jaccard similarity on the same number of ranked
and true labels.
4.2 Non-network Baselines
We measure the privacy shadow using an observed network. How-
ever, there are several non-network baselines which require zero
information about an individual node.
Recall that we defined the privacy shadow with respect to some
predictability threshold η. We use the expectation of the following
baseline distributions as criteria for when a node is no longer pre-
dictable. We use a straightforward population sampling, attribute
sampling, and true random sampling. Concretely, the length of the
privacy shadow can be interpreted as the time until the node’s
prior network neighborhood is no more predictive than random
population sampling on current data.
4.2.1 Population sampling. For each node, we sample (k = 20)
random nodes and aggregate attributes by the neighborhood model
as in the network model. We sample these independently at each
step in the node’s prediction interval. We denote this baseline by
‘population sampling‘ (pop).
4.2.2 Attribute sampling. For each node, we sample the median
attribute density (e.g. number of non-zero attributes) according to
the empirical likelihood of unique attributes over all nodes. These
are samples of the ‘average’ node with respect to both unique
attribute likelihood and node-attribute density (e.g. user activity).
We denote this baseline by attribute sampling (attr).
4.2.3 Random attribute sampling. While the above baselines use
random sampling, they should not be considered random models.
Instead they are global, non-network models i.e. “no network.” For a
truly randommodel, for each node we uniformly and independently
sample from the set of all labels. We denote this baseline as random
attribute sampling (rand).
In practice, we set η in the privacy shadow definition (Eq. 8) as
the maximum of all baseline expectations.
4.3 Measuring node cohorts
We define a s-length complete interval as an interval having non-
null predictions for all ∆ = [0...s]. The number of nodes satisfying
this definition is non-increasing for larger s . Without accounting for
this, measuring distributions of node statistics over varying∆would
produce incomparable results because the measured population is
changing per ∆ timestep.
We therefore build a cohort with s-length complete intervals and
measure all further statistics on these populations:
Rs (V ) = {R(i) is s-length complete,∀i ∈ V } (9)
5 DATASETS
Ourwork is primarily applied to dynamic, attributed, graph-structured
datasets with high attribute and label cardinality. Tables 1-2 give
an overview of datasets used in this work.
5.1 Last.fm
Last.fm is a music-focused social network where users can pro-
grammatically log their listening history, and interact with other
users. In this application, users are represented by nodes. Users
have time-stamped song plays, and user-attributes are the play
distribution of artist within a time window. Edges represent either
(1) friendship in the social graph or (2) an induced graph using
user-attribute similarity.
Prior work collected the complete listening data of more than
1M users between 2005 and 2016[6]. Similar to prior work, we use
the connected subgraph of 20K users discovered from crawling the
social graph from a seed node.
We collect a new label-set index, containing the top-500 most
frequent artist-tags. For each tag, we collect the top-1000 most
tagged artists. Within a time-step, a node is labeled with the tag-
label if the user has listened to more than (k = 5) of these top 1000
artists within the interval. We split the timeline into 50 equal-length
intervals, yielding 85 days per time-step.
We induce ak-nearest neighbor graph (k=20) fromnode-attribute
cosine similarity. We experimentally vary k and verify our privacy
shadow measurement is consistent, but the precise tuning of this
parameter is not important to demonstrate our methodology.
5.2 Movielens
Movielens is a platform for users to ratemovies and organizemovies
withmeta-data tags.We use theMovielens 25Mmovie rating dataset
[12] with data from 1997 to 2019, yielding 162K users (i.e. nodes)
with 25M ratings (i.e. node-attributes). Similar to our organization
of the Last.fm dataset, we group the 1000most common movie-tags
as our target label-set L. We create 50 equal-width intervals over
the time duration of the dataset, yielding 177 days per time step.
Dataset Nodes Edges Attributes Labels
Last.fm 20K [6] Users K-NN Artist listens User tags
MovieLens (25M) [12] Users K-NN Movie ratings User tags
AMiner (v2) [20, 23] Authors Co-authorship Paper keywords Paper keywords
Table 1: Datasets
Dataset |V | Median degree |A| Unique |L|
Last.fm 20K [6] 19,990 20 1.2B 498
MovieLens 25M [12] 162,542 20 25M 970
AMiner v2 [20, 23] 1,322,078 3 136B 634K
Table 2: Summary statistics of datasets
5.3 Open Academic Graph 2019
The Open Academic Graph [20, 23] dataset combines data from
Microsoft Academic Search andArnetMiner.We use theArnetMiner
dataset between the years of 1990 and 2019. We use yearly time-
steps since this is the smallest granularity of paper publication in the
dataset. This dataset contains 1.3M authors (i.e. nodes) with at least
20 total publications. Node-attributes are given by the aggregated
publication keywords within each year, and edges are defined as
the top-200 co-authors within that year.
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Figure 3: Predictive performance on Last.fm over ∆ time
shifts, for the sub-population with s=10 complete intervals
(|N |=16407). A data-point within each box-plot is a node’s
mean Jaccard similarity between predicted and actual labels
at an x = ∆, over all of the node’s prediction intervals. The
non-network baselines, pop, attr, and rand are reported on
the right.
Unlike Last.fm and Movielens, our prediction target is the key-
word distribution itself rather than a reduced label-set. The edge
definition is directly from data rather than induced, yielding a vari-
able degree distribution with median degree of 3.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Measuring the Privacy Shadow
In this section, we walk through the methodology for measuring the
privacy shadow on the Last.fm dataset and present other datasets
in Section 6.3.
Figure 3 shows the node prediction accuracy in terms of Jaccard
similarity between predicted and real labels on the Last.fm dataset.
Wemeasure the cohort which are at least s = 10 complete (≈ 2 years
of data), yielding |N | = 14712 measured nodes. In each box-plot, a
data-point is the mean Jaccard similarity of an individual node at
a ∆ timestep aggregated over all its prediction intervals. A node
may have a varying number of evaluated intervals, depending on
the node’s available data. ∆ = 0 measures the autocorrelation in
re-inferring labels from the same node attributes which induced
the k-NN network, under mean neighborhood aggregation.
On the right side of Figure 3, we evaluate the same set of nodes,
under varying non-network baselines (Section 4.2). Attribute sam-
pling (attr) performs approximately as well in expectation as the
network model at ∆ = 3, although the baseline has much higher
variance. The random label sampling rand performs much worse
than all other methods. This illustrates that random population
sampling is not a random labeling i.e. a purely random method.
Figure 4: The Privacy Shadow profile on Last.fm. The x-axis
correspond to nodes with x = t privacy shadow (Equation
8). η = 30-percentile is set against the reference distribution
(∆ = 0) by the maximum performing baseline (attr). The
y-axis reports the normalized fraction of nodes at this pri-
vacy shadow length. Take-away: more predictive nodes at
the start of an interval (∆ = 0) are predictive for longer. > 25%
of nodes are indefinitely predictive.
Figure 4 shows the privacy shadow of the same set of s = 10 com-
plete nodes on Last.fm (|N | = 14712). The x-axis caption reports the
η threshold given by the median of the attr baseline distribution,
which corresponds to the 31st percentile of the ∆ = 0 reference
distribution. This means that the bottom 31% of nodes perform no
better than sampling from the empirical attribute distribution. The
privacy shadow is the minimum time steps until this threshold is an
upper bound to a node’s performance for all subsequent time steps.
For example, 24% of nodes satisfy the 31-percentile threshold bound
at ∆ = 0. It is not necessarily true that 0.31 have a privacy shadow
length of 0, because nodes can stochastically improve performance
at later steps, yielding a non-zero privacy shadow. Nodes that never
satisfy the bound are indicated by inf on the right of the figure. Al-
though this cohort consists of nodes with s-complete intervals, we
measure their individual privacy shadow over all available data, so
nodes can have a privacy shadow greater than 10 time-steps. In Fig-
ure 4, the red y-axis reports the median percentile of nodes in this
bin, with respect to the reference distribution. For example, nodes
with infinite privacy shadow are in expectation at approximately
the 75th percentile in the reference distribution.
There are two key observations in these figures. First, for over
half of nodes, the network model is either never predictable or
is indefinitely predictable with only a small number of neighbors.
Concretely, for predictive nodes this means the data of 10 neighbors
performs better than attribute sampling, evenwhen those neighbors
were chosen as much as 45 time steps (10 years) ago. Second, the
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Figure 5: Last.fm score vs. score on a δ time horizon. For the
expected predictability of a node over its prediction inter-
vals, reported with respect to its percentile in the reference
distribution (x-axis). We group such observations by inte-
ger percentile and report the mean change in score (y-axis).
This shows that higher ranked nodes have higher negative
change.
length of the privacy shadow is positively correlated with the node’s
percentile in the reference distribution. This simply means that
nodes which are initially predictive remain predictive for longer.
Figure 5 summarizes the difference in a node’s predictability at
an arbitrary time step. For any time step t , the x-axis is the node’s
rank at time t with respect to the reference distribution. We group
observations by discrete percentiles. The y-axis shows the mean
difference at time t and time t + δ for nodes at this percentile.
This show that for Last.fm, the degradation in rank is not only
correlated with the initial rank of the node, but the loss in pre-
dictability scales linearly for any current observation of the node.
These values have a lower bound of the diagonal y = −x . At δ = 10,
the nodes measured in Last.fm are approximately y = −.25x .
6.2 Predicting the Privacy Shadow
We now aim to achieve our initial goal of predicting an individ-
ual node’s privacy shadow. In contrast to simply measuring the
privacy shadow post-hoc, we aim to give a user some guidance
about their predictability if they remove their data at the current
time. We demonstrate the utility of predicting from rank score tra-
jectories (Equation 7) over varying time-steps, generated from our
methodology above.
In this problem setting, we train a model offline on the full rank
trajectories of a training set of users. We simulate users leaving the
system by varying available data given to a simple gradient boosting
model2 using null fill values after varying time steps. Figure 6
2https://catboost.ai/
Figure 6: Prediction of privacy window length on Last.fm.
Reports the mean absolute error (MAE) of a model trained
on full prediction trejectories, and (x-axis) varying the
length of data visible to the model in inference by yielding
null data for t > x . A lower MAE shows the model better
predicts the privacy window length given longer score tra-
jectories.
reports the mean absolute error (MAE) of predicting the length
of privacy shadow from only rank trajectories, after observing
an increasing number of steps from the node (x-axis). We train
models over (|N|=30) randomly re-sampled train-test splits. This
MAE estimates the variance of our model for a particular user with
a given number of steps of observed data at opt-out. For example,
with 20 steps of rank trajectories (4.5 years), the model predicts
with MAE of 6 time steps (1.25 years). This can be greatly improved
in future work by considering better sequential models, or building
an auto-regressive or similar model directly from attributes.
We use a similar procedure to infer parameters of a line-fitting
model for extrapolation. For each training node’s complete rank
trajectory, we fit three models: Power Law (y = axλ + c), Exponen-
tial (y = eλx + c) and Linear (y = ax + b). At test time, we vary the
observed score trajectory length as above. For each sub-trajectory,
we select the fit parameters of the 1-nearest neighbor of training in-
stances. We then extrapolate on this model and return the predicted
privacy shadow length.
This method gives us more information about the model of dy-
namics for each dataset. While both Power Law and Linear produce
a good fit, the Power Law exponents tend to be yield a near-linear
model with small exponent: y = −14x0.42 at median exponent.
6.3 Discussion
In this section we qualitatively compare empirical results across
datasets and summarize our measurement and prediction results
on both MovieLens and AMiner datasets.
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(a) Predictability distributions vs Time ∆ (b) Privacy Shadow Profile vs. Median Score
(c) Score vs. Time-lagged Score
Figure 7: Results on MovieLens: This dataset shows very weak network signal. The predictive performance at time ∆=0 (a) is
much higher than non-network baselines but reduces sharply in the next timestep. (b) shows that 46 percent of nodes are no
better than the non-network baseline and 96% of nodes have a privacy shadow of length 0 or 1. Finally (c) confirms that even
at δ=1 is below the baseline distribution at any predictability.
Figure 7 summarizes the evaluation of the MovieLens dataset.
Overall, the induced k-NN no more predictive than baselines at any
time horizon. We verified this for a range of k values and training
window lengthsw . Also, the size of the cohort is much smaller than
other datasets, indicating there are fewer regular, long-term users
in MovieLens.
Figure 7a shows that at expectation, the network performance
drops by 0.3 after one time step, where both of the population base-
lines outperform the network. The privacy shadow profile in Figure
7b shows the network model is not predictive for nearly all nodes
after one time step. Finally, Figure 7c follows the lower bound along
y = −x . This means that the network model performs at the very
bottom of the reference distribution for all subsequent timesteps δ .
This is a spurious network definition which our measurement de-
tects. This is likely due to feedback with a recommendation engine
which may prompt users on similar films who have no long-term
correlation, e.g. during cold start.3
Figure 8 summarizes results on the AMiner dataset. The network
in AMiner is co-authorship network on annual time-steps. Unlike
Last.fm and MovieLens datasets, we use one year as the training
window. Recall that we predict the distribution a node’s publication
keywords over time.
Figure 8a shows that the network model re-infers approximately
40% at ∆ = 0 in expectation. This is a notable result since the unique
keywords are several orders of magnitude larger than the prior
two datasets (634K unique keywords). Due to the specialization of
labels within the network, all of the baselines perform very poorly.
This yields a very poor privacy shadow threshold at 1%. It is very
important that our privacy shadow threshold could greatly increase
with a better zero-knowledge baseline. Providing this model would
be complimentary to our methodology and we could measure the
AMiner dataset with greater fidelity.
3this explanation was provided by one of the collaborators on this dataset.
Figure 8b agrees with the previous result, demonstrating that
with respect to the baseline, the network model is indefinitely
predictive for most nodes.
Finally, Figure 8c shows that unlike Last.fm, the AMiner dataset
does not linearly scale with the percentile (x-axis). Instead, high-
ranked observations (> 60 percentile) degrade more slowly δ =
1, 2, 5 (years), but not at δ = 10. This may be an indication of the
time scale stable collaborations within this domain.
Figure 9 shows results for predicting the privacy shadow from
rank trajectories. In Figure 9a for MovieLens, we see that all models
perform trivially well. In this instance, the median is a constant
model yielding 0. We are less concerned with the relative perfor-
mance of the models. Instead, it again validates that the MovieLens
network is simply not predictive over time.
Figure 9 shows these results on AMiner. While the privacy
shadow profile (Figure 8b) looks very easy for a predictive model to
learn, it does surprisingly poorly with respect to the baselines. We
represent infinity as T + 1, where T is the time series length. The
median model yields T + 1. In practice, we therefore predict at 5
years MAE after 15 years of prediction trajectory. A better baseline
model would yield a more informative label distribution to learn
on. We will investigate this in future work.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proposed the privacy shadow, a simple method-
ology to measure node predictability over time from its prior local
neighborhoods. The privacy shadow measures nodes over arbi-
trary timesteps against non-network, zero-information methods.
We demonstrate that the length of the privacy shadow can be pre-
dicted from the simple rank trajectories from our methodology.
Finally, we argue this measure can yield better guidance for users
regarding the secondary effects of network structure on their pri-
vacy, even without direct access to their data. In this initial work,
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(a) Predictability distributions vs Time ∆ (b) Privacy Shadow Profile vs. Median Score (c) Score vs. Time-Horizon Score
Figure 8: Results on AMiner. In (a) the co-authorship network is very predictive compared to the non-network baseline which
fails for both node and attribute sampling. (b) Nearly 75% of nodes are indefinitely predictable by a node’s single-year co-
authorship neighborhood. (c) a node’s degradation over varying time-horizons. For highly predictive nodes > 90 percentile,
the network model is still greater than the 30-th percentile of the reference distribution after 10 years.
(a) MovieLens privacy shadow length prediction (b) AMiner privacy shadow length prediction
Figure 9: Privacy Shadow length prediction for MovieLens and AMiner datasets. In each figure, the length of the privacy
shadow is predicted at model inference, varying the data available to the model by yielding null data for t > x
we motivated the privacy shadow and demonstrated measuring it
empirically.
Future work is in several important directions. First, a better
understanding of privacy shadow dynamics under well-understood
synthetic random graphs and parametric attribute distribution as-
sumptions could provide better confidence bounds for prediction.
Similarly, dynamic network models provide powerful random-
ization methods to better parameterize and infer the rates of rank
degradation, e.g. as a function of transitioning to random models.
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